Abstract-By influencing the size and bargaining power of private insurers, public subsidization of private health insurance may project effects beyond the subsidized population. We test for such spillovers by analyzing how increases in insurer size resulting from the implementation of Medicare Part D affected drug prices negotiated in the non-Medicare commercial market. On average, Part D lowered prices for commercial enrollees by 3.7 percentage. The external commercial market savings amount to $1.5 billion per year, which, if passed to consumers, approximates the internal cost savings of newly insured subsidized beneficiaries. If retained by insurers, it corresponds to a greater than 9.25 percentage average increase in profitability on stand-alone drug insurance.
I. Introduction R ECENT expansions of health insurance coverage rely heavily on public financing of privately provided insurance. The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 established prescription drug benefits for Medicare beneficiaries through Part D, the largest expansion of Medicare in its history. While the government subsidizes roughly 75 percent of premiums under Part D, drug procurement is the domain of private insurers, who compete to design, price, and administer insurance policies. Likewise, the landmark Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) extends premium subsidies to many uninsured Americans, but tasks the private sector with administering health insurance policies for the newly insured. The deep involvement of the private sector creates a possible linkage between government health insurance subsidies and the private price negotiations typical in the market for medical goods and services. This could have important implications for total health care costs and the distributional effects of such policies.
This study focuses on how publicly financed coverage expansions-by increasing the size and bargaining power of private insurers-may affect prices in the broader commercial marketplace. Such price changes affect those newly insured by the coverage expansions, as well as individuals covered by the commercial insurance market external to the program. We consider the case of the MMA, which may have affected millions of individuals enrolled in the commercial, non-Part D insurance plans of Part D-participating insurers.
Much of the existing literature on Part D prices has focused on quantifying the success or failure of private firms in efficiently disseminating drug insurance to previously uninsured Medicare beneficiaries. There exists a general consensus that the private sector has improved seniors' access to drug coverage while lowering the drug prices faced by previously uninsured individuals (Lichtenberg & Sun, 2007; Ketcham & Simon, 2008; Yin et al., 2008; Duggan and Scott-Morton, 2010 ). Duggan and ScottMorton (2010) observe that Part D lowers average manufacturer revenues per prescription because previously uninsured seniors gain access to the discounted drug prices obtained by large private insurers.
There seems to be little doubt that insurance leads to lower prices for consumers who take up insurance. Less well studied, however, is the possibility that Part D's effects spilled over into the commercially insured population by influencing unit drug prices negotiated by insurers. MMA premium subsidies dramatically increased the number of Medicare beneficiaries with prescription drug coverage and injected millions of new customers into the insurance market. This increase was absorbed primarily by existing insurance firms, not new entrants, so that the MMA generally increased the enrolled population in existing private insurers. In turn, growth in Part D enrollments may affect the bargaining power of private payers in their general pricing negotiations with suppliers. According to standard bargaining theory, if larger buyers generate more surplus per unit for their suppliers, they possess more leverage and will be able to negotiate lower unit prices and retain a larger share of the total surplus; the reverse holds true when larger buyers generate less surplus per unit (Stole & Zwiebel, 1996; Brooks, Dor, & Wong, 1997; Chipty & Snyder, 1999; Raskovich, 2003) . 1 When insurer size lowers pharmacy prices, for example, we should observe price declines for insured consumers external to Part D. Specifically, we should observe larger declines in unit profits earned by pharmacies for the commercial (non-Medicare) claims of Part D-participating insurers that experience larger enrollment increases. 1 In the simplest case, where buyer and seller profit functions are linear in buyer size and the outside option for each side in the Nash game is 0, noncooperation penalizes the buyer and seller identically. Hence, the solution to the game is invariant to buyer size. A large theoretical literature offers a variety of explanations for why buyer size has an ambiguous effect on upstream price negotiations. The recent studies cited specify concavity conditions of the supplier's surplus function in order for larger buyers to extract larger rents in bilateral negotiations. Conditions in dynamic setting in which bargaining take place over repeated negotiations are studied by Snyder (1996) .
Finally, theory predicts the biggest effects on unit profits when pharmacies and insurers, rather than manufacturers, hold more of the total producer surplus. To see why, consider the extreme case where manufacturers possess all the bargaining power and perfectly competitive pharmacies and insurers never earn any profit. In this case, negotiations between insurers and pharmacies cannot alter the division of social surplus, because there are no profits to share between these two parties. This prediction implies stronger effects of insurer size on the retail prices of generic drugs compared to branded drugs.
The literature suggests the potential importance of these effects in health care. Sorensen (2003) finds buyer size effects for hospital services. He notes that large insurers obtain discounts for hospital services, but the magnitude of the effects is small relative to the price effects of insurers' ability to steer patients. Ellison and Snyder (2010) examine the effects of buyer size in the purchase of antibiotics, a large therapeutic class of drugs. Like Sorenson, they find buyer size effects; unlike Sorenson, they show that buyer size effects are most relevant where there are substitution opportunities, highlighting an important interaction between buyer size and upstream competition. Ellison and Snyder compare prices obtained by chains to those of independent retail pharmacies. Hence, identification of buyer size effects rests on the assumption that besides size, there are no other differences between chains and independent pharmacies that affect the prices of antibiotics negotiated with manufacturers.
2 Differences in pharmacy cost structure, distribution networks, and demand of its consumers may also affect negotiated manufacturer prices.
Both of these earlier papers demonstrated the existence and importance of buyer size discounts in health care and provided insight into their sources. We build on the existing literature in at least three ways. First, we provide a natural experiment in buyer size. The earlier studies did not have access to a natural experiment. Second, we develop the policy implications of buyer size effects for public health insurance schemes. Specifically, we demonstrate that buyer size effects create spillover effects from such schemes because subsidies for insurance purchase expand private health insurers. Finally, we provide a very simple theoretical illustration of why buyer size effects are ambiguous a priori, a point that is not always appreciated within the empirical literature.
We measure the effect of Part D enrollment increasesbuyer size-on negotiated retail prices and profits earned on prescriptions for individuals outside the Part D program. The empirical analysis relies on disaggregated claims data from one large national retail pharmacy chain that reports the drug prices negotiated between the pharmacy and every insurer with which it contracts.
An attractive feature of our approach is the absence of ex post rebates in agreements between pharmacies and insurers, making negotiated retail pharmacy prices readily observable and transparent. In addition, because the pharmacy's acquisition costs are constant across insurers for any given drug, between-insurer variation in negotiated prices reveals the marginal effect of insurer size on the pharmacy's unit profits, even without direct data on pharmacy costs. Finally, economic theory allows us to draw qualitative inferences about manufacturer profits from information about pharmacy profits. This strategy for indirect inference is valuable because net prices paid to manufacturers and paid by insurers are almost never observed by researchers. 3 We directly test the theoretical predictions that relate insurer enrollment size to retailer unit profits. We address the possible endogeneity of Part D enrollment by exploiting variation in insurers' potential Part D enrollment, a plausibly exogenous measure of insurers' geographic exposure to Medicare beneficiaries without drug coverage prior to Part D. We find that increases in insurer enrollment lead to lower unit profits earned by the pharmacy. Consistent with theory, buyer size generates larger profit reductions for generic drugs than for branded drugs. We then estimate the enrollment effect on retail prices, which is of independent interest as a measure of insurer and consumer expenditures. We find that enrolling an additional 100,000 Part D beneficiaries enables an insurer to negotiate 2 percent lower unit prices for individuals enrolled in commercial plans external to Part D. We also test and reject alternative explanations for the observed buyer size effect, including the possibility that on average, new Part D enrollees have lower demand for drugs than existing commercial enrollees, thereby lowering average demand (and negotiated prices) across insurers' total book of business.
Our results suggest that the external effect of Part D is not simply theoretical. Given the observed change in the enrollment of insurers participating in Part D and the estimated enrollment size elasticity, the program lowered overall retail prices for insurers' non-Part D enrollees by 3.7 percentage. We estimate the market-wide external savings to be $1.5 billion per year, nearly as large as the total internal cost savings for Part D enrollees who lacked any previous drug coverage. If insurers retain the additional rents, as suggested by the research demonstrating limited competition in the commercial insurance market (Dafny, 2010) , then these price reductions represent a greater than 9.25 percentage increase in average profitability for insurers writing both commercial prescription drug coverage and Part D policies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the MMA and the features of the drug market and then describes the predictions of the standard Nash bargaining framework applied to multilateral bargaining. Section III lays out the empirical strategy for estimating how enrollment affects pharmacy profits and prices as a consequence of insurer enrollment increases associated with Part D. Section IV reports results of the empirical analyses of pharmacy profits. In section V, we report results of the price analyses and then decompose the effect of Part D on total prescription drug expenditure reductions into internal and external effects. Section VI concludes. (Frank & Newhouse, 2008; Friedman, 2009) . The high public cost of the MMA, coupled with concerns over its impact on Medicare's long-term sustainability, has focused attention on the Part D drug purchasing model in particular.
Under the MMA, the government contracts with private insurers to administer drug plans. Hence, individual private insurers must negotiate retail drug prices and rebates directly with pharmacies and manufacturers. Figure 1 summarizes the purchasing model. A drug manufacturer earns revenues by selling drugs to wholesalers or directly to retail pharmacies at a price negotiated directly with each buyer. The manufacturer also negotiates rebates with individual insurers (private insurers, government agencies, and prescription benefits managers) that are tied to the insurers' purchase of its drug and inclusion, or preferential tiering, in their formularies. 4 Pharmacies similarly negotiate with individual insurers over the retail price they are paid when they dispense prescriptions to an insurer's enrollees. These bilateral negotiations generate retail prices reported in pharmacy claims, such as the claims data used in this analysis. How the negotiated payment to the pharmacy is then split between enrollee and insurer depends on the specific premium, copayment, and deductible architecture of the enrollee's insurance plan.
Part D insurers are restricted by statute to negotiate manufacturer rebates for Part D enrollees in a separate and firewalled manner. In principle, this separation limits the relationship between Part D and commercial lines of business within the same insurer. In practice, however, an insurer with more Part D enrollees may possess more de facto negotiating leverage in all transactions.
Note that no firewall exists for pharmacy retail price negotiations, allowing Part D enrollment to affect price negotiations for an insurer's commercial business directly. Moreover, changes in retail pharmacy prices have an impact on both insurer and pharmacy profits. Any change in buyer profits may also have an indirect impact on manufacturer profits because they determine the quantity of surplus available for pharmacies and manufacturers to share. This indirect effect on manufacturer profits will obtain even if the rebate firewall is respected.
B. Theoretical Relationships
Arguments for the possible effect of firm size on negotiations with suppliers have been posited since Galbraith (1952) and have been studied more formally in recent theoretical and empirical work. 6 In the pharmaceutical industry, where the distribution of rents among manufacturers, retail pharmacies, insurers, and enrollees has implications for health care costs, insurance coverage, and incentives to 4 In contrast, rebates are rarely paid to or by pharmacies. 5 For a comprehensive discussion of price negotiations and trends in reimbursements in the pharmaceutical industry, see Berndt and Newhouse (2010) . 6 Among many theoretical studies on the topic are Stole and Zwiebel (1996) , Brooks et al. (1997) , Chipty and Snyder (1999), and Raskovich (2003) , who specify concavity conditions that the supplier's surplus function must satisfy in order for large buyers to extract rents. Snyder (1996) studies this issue in dynamic settings. In the health literature, Sorenson (2003) studies the extent to which insurers' ability to exclude hospitals affects negotiated hospital (supplier) prices. In this paper, we estimate how bargaining power changes with the size of the buyer, holding constant its ability to steer its market. Consistent with Sorenson, our model suggests that buyer size affects bargaining power only when the buyer has some ability to steer its share across suppliers. We then explicitly test a model in which buyer size can either augment or diminish the impact of threats of network exclusion on retailer profits and negotiated prices in the pharmaceutical industry.
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7
Models of two-way bargaining between retailers and buyers exist in the literature. A well-known example is that of Chipty and Snyder (1999) , who implement a straightforward Nash bargaining approach to the problem. The principal difference in our context is the existence of a third ''player'' in the negotiations: the upstream manufacturer. In the online theoretical appendix, we demonstrate that Chipty and Snyder's results generalize quite naturally to this threeway bargaining context. Following the theoretical findings of Chipty and Snyder, the analysis of bargaining among these players generates three empirical implications.
Implication 1 is that insurer size has an ambiguous effect on the profits of both the pharmacy and the insurer. The negotiating leverage of one side depends on the surplus it generates for its trading partners. If larger buyers generate more surplus per unit for their partners, they will receive better prices, and vice versa. Typical of standard bilateral bargaining models, the effect of buyer size on unit surplus is ambiguous and depends on the curvature of the supplier's surplus function (Stole & Zwiebel, 1996; Brooks et al., 1997; Chipty & Snyder, 1999; Raskovich, 2003) . Intuitively, if the seller's surplus function is convex in quantity, a larger marginal buyer generates more surplus per unit sold than would be generated by a smaller marginal buyer. In such a case, the larger buyer is more valuable to the seller on the margin and will thus extract more favorable terms. The reverse is also true: a concave surplus function means a larger buyer generates less surplus per unit sold and receives less favorable terms. Figure 2 illustrates the basic intuition.
In the empirical analysis that follows, we directly estimate the direction and magnitude of the buyer size effect on unit profits in the context of the retailer-buyer price negotiations.
The Second implication is that when drug manufacturers hold more of the bargaining power, changes in insurer size cause smaller changes in insurer or pharmacy profits. Intuitively, consider the extreme case where manufacturers extract all the rents. This would be true if the manufacturer held a patent monopoly on a product with perfectly inelastic demand. Thus, all downstream parties earn zero profits, and there is nothing for the downstream firms to divide. As a result, increases in insurer size cannot change the prices paid by the insurer to the pharmacy. Branded drugs with no therapeutic substitutes (and, thus, inelastic demand) may exemplify such cases. Generic drugs represent the opposite extreme. For these drugs, bargaining power is held entirely by pharmacies and insurers, in which case the potential impact of changes in insurer size on the share of surplus accruing to pharmacies and insurers is maximized.
The third implication is that when all sides have some degree of bargaining power, changes in profits of manufacturers and pharmacies correlate positively with external shocks to the insurer's size. Among other things, this means that increases in the size of an insurer will have qualitatively similar effects on the profits of pharmacies and manufacturers. Because manufacturer profits are not observed, we cannot test this implication directly. Nevertheless, if the Nash bargaining model is valid, we can draw qualitative inferences about changes in manufacturer profits, using the sign of the enrollment size elasticity we estimate on retail pharmacy profits. ½ ) than the unit surplus generated by a smaller unmerged marginal buyer, M /(Q s À Q s 2 ½ ). The opposite is true for convex surplus function. That all buyers bargain as the marginal buyer is the limiting case of a more general extensive form game, where the limit is taken as the probability of negotiating breakdowns approacing 0.
7 See the discussion in Sorenson (2003) and Ellison and Snyder (2010) in section I. Other studies in the health care literature have primarily focused on how characteristics of upstream providers affect negotiations with downstream payers (Town & Vistnes, 2001 ). More recently, Ho (2009) studies how hospital performance and provider network structure affect bargaining outcomes with downstream payers. In the pharmaceutical industry, the complex market structure and paucity of negotiated price data make these issues difficult to study.
Specifically, if larger insurers receive lower prices on drug X from pharmacies, the Nash bargaining framework implies that larger insurers drive down the profits earned on drug X by both the manufacturer and the pharmacy.
III. Empirical Strategy
To test the theoretical predictions about profits, we empirically examine the impact of insurer enrollment on changes in pharmacy profits per unit (i.e., per pill) and investigate how these vary with the competitiveness of drug classes. These findings, coupled with the theoretical predictions above, are used to draw quantitative and qualitative inferences about the distribution of rents among manufacturers, pharmacies, insurers, Part D enrollees, and commercial enrollees. We then measure the marginal impact of insurer enrollment on retail prices, which we use to quantify the absolute external impact of Part D-related enrollment on retail drug expenditures in the non-Part D commercial market.
A. Data
Data on prescription drug utilization and expenditures come from a national retail pharmacy chain. As of January 1, 2006, when Medicare Part D was implemented, the pharmacy chain had a retail presence in 45 states, and prescriptions filled at its pharmacies accounted for approximately one-fourth of the U.S. prescription market.
We obtained all pharmacy claims for a 5 percent random sample of unique pharmacy customers over the age of 60. For these individuals, we obtained data on claims for every prescription filled at the chain between September 1, 2004, and April 31, 2007 . Each claim reports the national drug code (NDC) of the prescription filled; its therapeutic class; the pill quantity; the number of treatment days; the date dispensed; the identification of the third-party payer; whether the insurance plan is a commercial, Medicare Part D, or Medicare Advantage plan; the out-of-pocket and thirdparty-payer expenditures; and the address of the pharmacy where the claim took place. The claims data also contain information on subjects' demographic characteristics (date of birth, sex, language preference, and postal code of residence). With these data, we are able to determine the drug prices negotiated between the pharmacy and each insurer for every drug appearing in the claims.
The pharmacy claims data report drug utilization largely consistent with that reported in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for the same period. Negotiated pharmacy prices for the same drug vary considerably across insurers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of normalized retail prices of drugs at the NDC insurer level, separately for branded and generic drugs. In figure 2 (left), prices are measured as the percentage difference between the retail price an NDC-level drug negotiated by an insurer and the average price of that drug across all insurers; in figure 2 (right), prices measured are the absolute difference between these two quantities.
In both figure panels, variation for a given drug exists across insurers. The distribution of relative prices of generic drugs is noticeably wider than the distribution of prices of branded drugs, whether measured ratios or absolute differences. These facts are consistent with relatively less surplus accruing to pharmacies when manufacturers have more bargaining power; when there is less surplus to be bargained over in negotiations between the pharmacy and downstream buyers, less price dispersion results. The fact that the absolute price differences for generic drugs exceed those of branded drugs is particularly striking given the much lower price levels for generic drugs. This suggests the strength of the economic forces that eliminate downstream surplus for branded drugs.
Our database contains most large insurers that participate in Medicare Part D. In general, two reasons explain why a Part D insurer would not appear in our claims database: (a) the pharmacy did not contract with the insurer or claims from the insurer are not sampled from the full pharmacy claims. Both reasons suggest that smaller insurers are less likely to appear in the claims data. Table 2 shows the distri- The top Data on enrollment, premiums, and benefit design for Part D and Medicare Advantage plans come from CMS. Plan-level information also identifies the sponsoring insurance firm, so we can aggregate enrollment to the insurer. Premium information corresponds to end-of-year open enrollment premium pricing for coverage beginning the following year. The CMS website makes publicly available both the enrollment and Part D landscape files.
B. Basic Empirical Framework and Threats to Identification
Supplier profit equation. To test how enrollment affects profits, we exploit the introduction of Part D, which brought millions of newly insured individuals onto the rolls of existing insurers. We test whether insurers that experienced greater enrollment increases due to Part D negotiated lower unit profits earned by the pharmacy in their non-Part D commercial market.
At its core, the theory suggests that pharmacy profits earned on drug d and insurer i depend on insurer i's size. We take two steps to make this conceptual framework empirically tractable. First, since the functional form is unknown and there is no obvious functional form satisfying all the relevant conditions of the theory, we take a linear approximation to the profit function around the pre-Part D equilibrium point. The linear approximation approach will capture the local average treatment effect of Part D, but it does not allow us to conduct counterfactual simulations, which we avoid. The result is a regression equation that relates the change in profits due to Part D as a linear function of the change in enrollment and a vector of other druginsurer characteristics and controls, X d;i . Second, we use the change in an insurer's Part D enrollment as a proxy for the total change in enrollment (the empirical implications of this assumption and our approach for dealing with the resulting bias are discussed below). The estimating equation is
The dependent variable is the change in the profits per pill earned by the pharmacy over prescriptions of drug d filled by enrollees of insurer i from before and after the implementation of Part D.
10 Here and throughout the balance of our analysis, a ''drug'' d is an NDC number.
11 Pharmacy profits are defined as profits d;i price d;i À cost d . Price d;i is the negotiated retail price, which varies across drug and insurer; cost d;t is the acquisition cost of drug d to the pharmacy, which is constant across insurers. It follows The distribution of insurers by their Part D enrollment. For each enrollment bin, the table reports the number insurers participating in Part D reported by CMS, the number of these insurers that appear in the pharmacy claims, and the fraction of Part D participating insurers that appear in the claims, where each insurer is weighted by their Part D enrollment.
9 The first-difference estimation framework outlined below requires repeated claims for each insurer-NDC cell. Seventy-four of the 89 Part D insurers observed in the claims data have repeated claims for at least one insurer-drug cell. Thirty-three of 74 of the observed insurers offer at least one stand-alone Part D plan. This sample eliminates insurers that offer only Medicare Advantage plans (whose premiums also cover medical care) and Medicare prescription drug demonstration plans. To maintain consistency across specification, the analyses are restricted to the 33 private insurers that offer stand-alone Part D plans. 10 Price negotiations for drugs between insurers and pharmacies are conducted at the national level; hence, this study is conducted at the insurer-drug level. Some insurers negotiate through prescription benefits managers (PBMs). In cases when the pharmacy claims specifically identify both an insurer and its PBM as the payer, the insurer in the sample is defined at the level of its PBM. In a previous version of this paper, we conducted the analysis at the insurer-drug-state level in order to capture slight differences in factor costs (and, hence, unit profits) across states. These differences are negligible and are averaged out in the insurer-drug analysis. Conducting the analysis at the disaggregated level yields nearly identical results to those reported here.
11 Technically, an NDC number is below the aggregation level of a drug, or molecule, because it identifies different labelers and packages for a given molecule. The ten-digit NDC code captures package numbers (e.g., drugs sold in blister packs) and are the most disaggregated level of analysis possible. Note that for many NDCs, pill counts are at the discretion of the prescribing physician and are unlikely to be systematically related to insurer size. Not surprisingly, inclusion of the average pill count control variable has negligible effects on the estimated buyer size effects. Its inclusion serves mainly to absorb residual variation. that Dprofits d;i ¼ Dprice d;i À Dcost d , where differences in retail profits across insurers are driven solely by differences in negotiated retail prices for a given drug.
Note that the pharmacy claims data report only negotiated prices, not acquisition costs or profits. To estimate equation (1), therefore, we rewrite it as
The drug-level intercept, d d , captures drug-specific unobserved characteristics, including Dcost d;t , which varies across drugs but is constant across insurers for a given drug. Regressing first-differenced price levels on enrollment and NDC-level drug fixed effects allows b in equation (2) to be interpreted as the effect of enrollment on pharmacy profits. This interpretation is justified rigorously in the online theoretical appendix. All estimates of the semielasticity b reported below come from the estimation of equation (2). We calculate the dependent variable in equation (2) The vector of covariates, X, includes a measure of each insurer's exposure to the pharmacy, 12 the average wholesale price of the drug, and the average number of pills sold per prescription for a given drug d and insurer i.
13 In specifications that include drug fixed effects, we necessarily drop the wholesale price change variable. The first-difference specification also eliminates time-invariant drug, insurer, and market-level characteristics. The coefficient on enrollment changes captures the average linear effect of enrollment increases on negotiated retail prices across insurers of all sizes.
The coefficient b in equation (2) is also relevant for understanding the effect of insurer enrollment increases on drug manufacturer profits. The Nash bargaining framework implies a positive correlation between changes in pharmacy and manufacturer profits that result from changes in insurer size. Therefore, under Nash bargaining, the coefficient b in equation (2) has the same sign as the effect of insurer enrollment on manufacturer profits.
The analysis is conducted at the insurer-NDC level, which is equivalent to an NDC-weighted insurer-level regression of average profits earned by the pharmacy on insurer-level enrollment increases. All analyses are clustered at the insurer level, an acknowledgment that identification comes from cross-insurer variation in enrollment changes. This clustering allows for cross-NDC intra-insurer correlation in the error structure, so we remain agnostic on how discounts are distributed across NDCs within an insurer. As discussed in section II, our model does make one theoretical prediction related to differential buyer size effects across NDCs: that there should be smaller size effects when more surplus is retained by the manufacturer (e.g., branded drugs with few substitutes). This motivates specifications where we limit the sample to only branded drugs or only generic drugs.
Retail pricing equation. While economic theory provides more powerful predictions for changes in profits than changes in pharmacy prices, the latter are of independent empirical interest as a measure of changes in external costs to commercial enrollees and insurers. Therefore, we estimate a second set of models relating log price changes to Part D enrollment changes:
The log-linear specification in equation (3) generates an estimate of the semielasticity, h, that captures the average effect of enrollment increases on log negotiated retail prices across insurers of all sizes at baseline. We then use our estimate of h in equation (3) and the observed distribution of enrollment increases to quantify the change in insurer costs in the commercial market, in levels and percentages, associated with Part D-related insurer size increases. Note that in estimating b in equations (2) and (3), we are estimating enrollment semielasticities, not strict elasticities. If we observed total commercial enrollment, a more structural approach to estimating the effect of log changes in total enrollment levels would be possible. As noted earlier, absent data on non-Part D commercial enrollment, we adopt linear approximations, which will be sufficient as long as we limit ourselves to estimating effects of observed enrollment increases rather than attempting to forecast counterfactuals far off the equilibrium path. To the extent that a given enrollment increase generates heterogeneous effects at different initial levels, the local average treatment effects in the data will faithfully estimate the actual historical effects of Part D on profits and prices. This is how we interpret our results and do not attempt to engage in simula- 12 Theory suggests that greater exposure to the pharmacy may affect bargaining power in bilateral negotiations. Exposure is an insurer-level measure of the market share of the pharmacy with respect to an insurer. It is calculated as the average market share of the pharmacy across states, where state-level market shares are weighted by an insurer's total business in each state. Data on pharmacy market share were obtained from the Chain Store Guide, which reports annual sales and store counts of all pharmacies (total and by chain) for local geographies in the United States for 2004 through 2008. 13 Recall that the dependent variable is the price per pill averaged over all prescriptions observed in each cell. Given that prescriptions contain any number of pills, this measure controls for changes in the average number of pills per prescription in each cell over time, which may affect average price per pill through slight bulk rate pricing.
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tions of what might happen in the future with enrollment increases that are far out of sample.
Threats to identification. In equations (2) and (3), we estimate the impact of changes in enrollment due to Part D on supplier unit profits and prices. However, the model in section II implies that changes in total enrollment, not just changes in Part D enrollment, affect unit profits of suppliers. Data on insurers' total prescription drug enrollment are not available, 14 but Part D enrollment data are publicly available from CMS. Therefore, we model the impact of new Part D enrollment on changes in negotiated prices. Crowd-out of this sort appears to be sizeable in aggregate (Englehardt & Gruber, 2010) . Lack of data on total drug insurance enrollment at the firm level prevents our calculating net increases in Part D enrollment for each insurer. As a result, crowd-out will generally lead to our underestimating the true impact of enrollment on negotiated prices. To see how, note that
We model observed changes in Part D enrollment as a mismeasurement of the net change in Part D enrollment, where 0 < q < 1 is the market-average proportional extent of crowd-out, and n i is an insurer-level mean-zero error term. Also note the accounting identity:
The object of interest is the relationship between total insurer size and pharmacy profits, or the coefficient w in
Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (6) yields
where e d;i wDCommercial Enrollment i þ wn i þ t d;i . 15 Our estimate of b, the Part D enrollment effect on profits in equations (1) and (2) is, therefore, an underestimate of the structural enrollment effect, w, by a proportionality factor of 0 < q < 1; as a result, one should view our estimates as lower bounds on the true enrollment effect. 16 Likewise, our estimate of h, the enrollment semielasticity of retail prices from equation (3), is an underestimate of the structural elasticity by the same proportional factor, q.
Equation (7) makes clear how potential sources of endogeneity may bias our estimate of b wq. Most obviously, changes in Part D enrollment may be correlated with changes in commercial enrollment (i.e., correlation between Part D enrollment and n i;t ). This could happen if a more aggressive pursuit of enrollment in the Part D market is associated with a similar pursuit of commercial market share, leading to an upward bias in our estimate of b; alternatively, pursuit of Part D enrollment may be associated with less aggressive growth in commercial enrollment due to insurers' specializing in the new Part D market, leading to downward bias. To the extent that this correlation exists, instruments are needed to generate unbiased estimates of b.
There may also be additional sources of bias operating through a correlation between changes in enrollment and t d;i;t . There is evidence that Part D enrollees place excessive weight on premiums over drug prices and cost sharing when selecting plans (Abaluck & Gruber, 2011; Kling et al., 2012) . The sickest patients, however, may be more sensitive to out-of-pocket costs relative to the average enrollee, and therefore more likely to select into plans with greater expected future price declines, leading to higher premiums for those plans. Consequently, plans with larger increases in out-of-pocket costs may have lower initial premiums and greater enrollment; this would bias estimates of b downward. Institutional rules may drive dual-eligible Medicaid beneficiaries (individuals enrolled in both Medicaid and Medicare) into plans with below-median premiums that may enjoy systematically slower (or faster) growth in drug prices. Either self-selection, or automated enrollment, into plans with lower future drug price growth would also generate biased estimates of the enrollment elasticity of price changes.
17 These kinds of issues are also addressed by an instrumental variables strategy, discussed in detail below.
14 Data on insurers' total medical insurance enrollment are available from several sources. For instance, TheStreet.com (and previously Weiss Ratings) reports enrollment, network size, assets, and income for every medical underwriter annually. However, enrollment in drug insurancethe relevant measure of buyer size for drug price negotiations-is not reported separately. Further, enrollment of prescription benefits managers is not reported by these publishers. 15 Analogous to equations (1) and (2), recall that the coefficient on enrollment in equation (7) is equivalent to the coefficient on enrollment in
is, the profit equation in which changes in level prices are regressed against Part D enrollment and NDC-level drug fixed effects. 16 The market-wide extent of crowd-out, q, can be calculated in the aggregate data, implying that can be recovered by scaling up our estimated b by a factor of 1=q.
17 Another source of bias may come from a correlation between enrollment (due to low premiums) and the propensity of a plan to drive generic drug utilization. This would bias the estimate of the enrollment elasticity in the cross section, but not in a first-difference analysis of unit price changes for a given insurer-drug.
Finally, the timing of and nature of contracts could cause OLS estimates of b to be downward biased. Contracts typically last one to two years and are volume based. Volumebased contracts account for ongoing changes in enrollment and claims volume. In instances where contracts are not volume based, the timing of Part D is such that our data may measure prices between contracts. Forward-looking parties would nevertheless factor in anticipated changes in enrollment, but such contracts would not capture unanticipated enrollment changes. Unanticipated enrollment changes function statistically as measurement error, biasing downward OLS estimates of b. The prevalence of volume-based contracts suggests that this bias would be small. Nevertheless, this bias is addressed by the instrumental variables strategy discussed below. A number of possible concerns with this instrument are alleviated by the unique form of our estimation problem. Since we are analyzing the first year of Part D implementation, the level of Part D enrollment is equal to the change in Part D enrollment. Therefore, we are estimating the relationship between price changes and Part D enrollment levels. Bias will occur if unobserved heterogeneity in predictors for enrollment levels is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in price changes. This would be an unusual type of correlation. In particular, our instrument presumes that the level of an insurer's exposure to previously uninsured Medicare beneficiaries is uncorrelated with anticipated changes in an insurer's future negotiated prices. Later, we present evidence supporting this assumption.
The instrument implies the following first-stage equation, which precedes the second-stage profit-enrollment equation: We examine this potential validity issue in two ways. First, we estimated the relationship between firm size, as measured by the size of its observed commercial market in the pharmacy claims, and pre-Part D changes in drug prices. Importantly, we find no relationship between the two quantities across various specifications and definitions of insurer size. Results from these tests are reported in appendix table 1. Second, we directly estimate the relationship between potential Part D enrollment levels and changes in commercial enrollment. While we are limited by the lack of market data on insurers' commercial enrollment, we do have pharmacy claims data for a limited set of commercial enrollees-those ages 60 to 64. Using these data, we are able to regress the potential Part D enrollment variable on 2005 to 2006 changes in commercial market size, as measured by total commercial claims for those ages 60 to 64. This provides a scaled measure of commercial enrollment size. We find that the coefficient on potential Part D enroll- 
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ment is negative and statistically insignificant. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that exposure to greater levels of uninsured seniors is systematically related to increases in commercial market size.
19
To our knowledge, there are no other obvious theoretical reasons why pre-Part D exposure to more uninsured Medicare beneficiaries should predict differential future postPart D growth in the unit prices paid by an insurer. This is especially true in light of our finding that there is no relationship between enrollment and price changes prior to implementation of Part D or between Part D enrollment and changes in commercial market size.
Understanding the explanatory power of the enrollment and pricing instruments. Table 3 illustrates the operation of the instrument. The table presents data on four insurers, similar in the size of their total commercial enrollment, ordered from smallest to largest in terms of commercial claims expenditures, reported in column 1. Exposure to the Part D marketplace, reported in column 2, is not just a simple function of size. Insurer A (the smallest) has the greatest potential Part D exposure due to its heavy market penetration in states with high elderly population shares (e.g., Florida). Column 3, which reports actual Part D enrollment, shows that the greatest Part D enrollment ends up accruing to insurer A, as predicted by the potential enrollment variable. Note that the ranking of actual enrollment values tracks that of potential enrollment, except that potential enrollment fails to distinguish between insurers B and C, which have similar potential enrollment values.
Our estimation sample contains the 33 insurers in our data for which we can calculate all the necessary covariates (figures 3 and 4). Figure 4 reports actual versus potential enrollment for 32 of these 33. While potential enrollment is not perfectly correlated with actual enrollment, there is a visual upward slope in the relationship. The noise in the relationship appears to come from some insurers that stay out of the Part D market rather than insurers that secure far greater Part D enrollment than predicted. This suggests that potential enrollment creates option value for insurers, which many (but not all) exercise. Figure 3 excludes one insurer, Humana, whose actual enrollment of 4.5 million would skew the figure so much as to render the other points indistinguishable.
First-stage power. The enrollment instrument appears to successfully ''treat'' 32 of the 33 insurers, with the one exception of Humana. To show this formally, we calculated the first-stage F-statistics after sequentially dropping each of the 33 insurers. We found that the first-stage F-statistic is no larger than 2.01 across the 32 insurer combinations that include Humana, and 16.00 in the one specification that excludes Humana. Next, we repeated the exercise among the 32 treated insurers, excluding Humana. The F-statistics are consistently larger than 10.65, suggesting that no one insurer is driving the first-stage explanatory power of the potential enrollment measure.
This finding is consistent with known features of Humana's business strategy, which aimed to underprice pre- Illustrates The distribution of retail prices of drugs across insurers, where price is measured as the percentage difference between the retail price of an NDC-level drug negotiated by an insurer and the average retail price of that drug across all insurers. In panel b, price is measured as the absolute difference between the retail price of a given NDC-level drug and the average price of that drug across all insurers. Data come from one point in time (September 2005) so that variation in both figures, for a given NDC, comes from variation in negotiated prices across insurers.
miums to gain Part D market share and then to switch enrollees into their highly profitable Medicare managed care plans (Krasner, 2006; Gleckman, 2006) . To see Humana's pricing strategy more clearly, we regress the log premium of plan p offered by insurer i in market m on plan characteristics D 20 and insurer fixed effects, r i , as in
The sample of plans is restricted to standard and actuarially equivalent plans sold in the same CMS-defined Part D market, thereby allowing us to purge observed premiums of benefit design and plan generosity characteristics and to isolate pure premium pricing variation at the insurer level. Figure 5 depicts the distribution of insurer fixed effects for the 33 insurers in our sample. The figure reveals a fairly tight bell shape in the distribution of the fixed effects. Humana is clearly an outlier, on average pricing its plan at a 70 percent discount relative to identical plans sold in the same market. While the potential enrollment measure predicts Humana to be among the larger Part D insurers, it nonetheless vastly understates the actual enrollment increase for Humana, likely due to its aggressive premium discounting strategy. Including Humana in the analysis necessitates accounting for its exceptional premium pricing strategy and the nonlinear form of its enrollment effect. Analyzing all the nonHumana insurers allows for a simpler linear design that serves as the baseline specification reported in the text. The appendix reports more complex, nonlinear models that include Humana as well. Significantly, the estimates are highly similar across the two sample specifications.
To reflect the sample of insurers, we interpret our baseline estimates as valid local average treatment effects of enrollment on profits and prices for all insurers other than Humana. Our estimates of aggregate cost savings also conservatively assume that Humana makes no contribution to the marketlevel effects of enrollment on aggregate expenditures.
The online empirical appendix introduces a nonlinear effect of enrollment on prices and profits, along with a more complex first-stage estimation strategy that better reflects Humana's pricing behavior. Specifically, the appendix exploits both the geographic variation in insurers and the variation in each firm's quality-adjusted premium (premium purged of benefits generosity and drug costs) as an additional instrument that bears on Humana's premium-setting strategy. This approach generates estimates that fit Humana's behavior better and should in principle apply to Humana as well. Estimated enrollment elasticities and predicted price declines are nearly identical for the 32 common insurers across the two strategies. The only notable difference is in the estimated aggregate cost savings: including Humana leads to slightly larger savings.
D. Market Structure and General Equilibrium Considerations
The coefficient on new Part D enrollment in equations (2) and (7) can be interpreted as the effect of insurer size on retail unit profits and log prices. Yet in general equilibrium, the estimate might be confounded by the responses of suppliers. For example, when insurers gain more leverage, pharmacies have greater incentives to grow, consolidate, or otherwise strengthen their own bargaining positions. If this occurs, our coefficient will underestimate the true effect of insurer size on negotiated retail prices and unit profits of the pharmacy.
We account for the general equilibrium possibility in two ways. First we control for the leverage of the pharmacy with a measure of changes in insurers' exposure to the pharmacy. Exposure is an insurer-level measure of the statelevel market share of the pharmacy, weighted by the frac- 
FIGURE 5-DISTRIBUTION OF QUALITY-ADJUSTED PREMIUMS
The distribution of insurers' quality-adjusted premium, calculated as the difference in log premiums across standardized Part D plans sold in the same market, controlling for plan generosity and drug costs. Average Part D enrollment across insurers within a bin is labeled above key points in the distribution. 20 The vector D contains the following plan-level characteristics: plan annual deductible; whether the plan is a low-income subsidy plan; whether the plan covers generics and branded drugs in the ''coverage gap''; whether the plan covers generics and some branded drugs in the coverage gap; and whether the plan covers no drugs in the coverage gap.
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tion of the insurer's total retail expenditures in each state. The control variable strategy works as long as the pharmacy's bargaining leverage enters the estimating equation linearly.
As a more general approach, we explicitly test for the presence of general equilibrium effects over the time frame of our data. In particular, we estimate whether the pharmacy increases its market share when insurers increase enrollment as a result of Part D, as in
We estimate this equation for all insurers in the sample, where exposure is the insurer-level measure of the pharmacy's market share described above. We estimate this equation using OLS and IV, making use of the instrument described in section IIIC. 
IV. Identifying the Effects of Part D on Pharmacy Profits
We examine the effects of insurer enrollment size on pharmacy profits per pill and price per pill in the commercial market external to Medicare Part D.
A. Correlation between Unit Prices and Enrollment
To examine the correlation between changes in unit prices and enrollment, we regress change in log drug prices on all covariates in equation (3) except the key explanatory variable, insurers' Part D enrollment. We then plot residuals from this regression against insurers' Part D enrollment. Figure 6a shows the scatter plot of residuals against firstyear Part D enrollment. The correlation is clearly negative. We test for a causal relationship in the analyses below.
B. Enrollment and Retail Profits in the Commercial,
Non-Part D Market Table 4 reports enrollment effects on changes in retail profits per pill from the estimation of equation (1) on all commercially insured, non-Part D claims. As described in section III, the effect on profits per pill can be recovered by estimating equation (2) using price changes as the dependent variable, with drug-level fixed effects. The dependent variable reflects changes in average profits per pill between the second half of 2005 and the first half of 2006 at the insurer-drug level. In all specifications, insurer-drug level observations are weighted by the number of claims for the drug observed for that insurer.
Columns 1 and 2 report our results. Among the 32 treated insurers, the first-stage explanatory power of the potential enrollment instrument is sufficiently strong. In the second stage, among all other insurers, enrollment lowers pharmacy profits. When there are 100,000 additional Part D enrollees, there are lower profits per pill in the commercial market by 1.3 cents in the OLS specification (column 1) and 2 cents in the IV specification (column 2).
Columns 3 and 4 report results of validity tests using the pre-Part D period. We test whether insurers' Part D enrollment is correlated with retail profit changes from 2004 to 2005, prior to the implementation of the program. If the effects reported in columns 1 and 2 are causal, then no such relationship should be evident. However, if there are differ- ential trends in profits per pill that are systematically correlated with firms' geographic distributions, these placebo regressions would turn up significant effects. We obtain fairly precise zeroes. The standard errors on the coefficients are even smaller than in our benchmark models, and the estimates are insignificant. This provides evidence against the concern that our main results are driven by long-term trends in price negotiations that happen to be correlated with changes in Part D enrollment.
Results of analogous specifications that include Humana and the additional quality-adjusted premium instrument are discussed in the empirical appendix. In these specifications, the estimated enrollment elasticity and predicted effects are similar, if slightly larger.
C. Enrollment Effects and Retail Profits, by Drug Type
The theory predicts that results might differ by the degree of bargaining power held by the manufacturer. Recall that if manufacturers hold all the bargaining power, enrollment will have no impact on profits for pharmacies or insurers, as all the rents remain with the manufacturer. To test this hypothesis, we repeat the analysis stratifying the sample by branded and generic drugs. The operative assumption is that manufacturers of generic drugs possess less bargaining power against insurers and pharmacies than do manufacturers of branded drugs.
Results are reported in table 5. Column headings specify the comparison period (relative to the second half of 2005) used in the first-difference profit analysis. Columns 1 through 3 report the enrollment effects separately for branded and generic drugs. An additional 100,000 enrollees leads to an approximate 2 cent decline in retail profits per pill observed in the non-Part D commercial market from the second half of 2005 to the first half of 2006. This effect is driven by a 3 cent decline in unit profits earned by the pharmacy on generic drugs. The less-than-1-cent decline in profits on branded drugs is statistically insignificant. As derived in the text, including NDC-level drug fixed effects allows for the coefficients on enrollment to be interpreted as an enrollment elasticity of unit profits. Covariates include changes in the average number of pills per prescription and changes in each insurer's exposure to the pharmacy (the state-level market share of the pharmacy, weighted by the fraction of the insurer's total retail expenditures in each state). The sample of drugs comprises the top 1,000 drugs ranked by expenditures observed in the claims. The instrument for Part D enrollment is potential Part D enrollment. In all specifications, insurer-NDC-level observations are weighted by the number of claims for the NDC observed for that insurer. Parentheses report standard errors clustered at the insurer level. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
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Columns 4 through 6 report the falsification test relating enrollment increases to pre-Part D profit changes. We find no evidence of preexisting trends in the profits earned on either generic or branded drugs.
Theory suggests that pharmacy profits on a particular product are positively correlated with the profits of the corresponding manufacturer. These results therefore, suggest that Part D health insurers experienced gains at the expense of pharmacies, which lose profits they were previously earning on drugs in competitive categories. We show evidence for generic drugs, which account for over 60 percentage of all claims and roughly 25 percentage of all total outpatient pharmaceutical expenditures (Berndt & Newhouse, 2010) . These results are also consistent with theory that suggests gains in insurer bargaining power versus manufacturers of those drugs.
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Earlier research by Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010) shows that Part D lowers average revenue per prescription for both branded and generic drugs. Our results indicate that the branded drug effects they estimate are likely to be driven by cash-paying patients who switch into insurance and receive the lower retail prices enjoyed by insurers. There are no additional unit price reductions within the set of insured patients that could extend beyond the Part D population. For generic drugs, however, we find this spillover effect.
D. Alternative Mechanisms
The buyer size effects reported above may be explained by heterogeneous demand effects. Specifically, new Part D enrollees may have lower demand for drugs than existing commercial enrollees. If so, increases in enrollment due to Part D would have lowered average demand for drugs across an insurer's total book of business, potentially leading to lower negotiated prices and pharmacy unit profits. 22 We test this hypothesis empirically. We test whether demand for prescription drugs, as measured by total prescription drug spending Hence, contrary to the alternative mechanism, the marginal insured who obtained coverage in response to Medicare Part D on average had significantly greater demand for drugs than the commercially insured population.
The finding is quite intuitive given the channels of enrollment that account for commercial drug coverage. Relatively healthy individuals may choose to hold prescription drug coverage because plans in the commercial market are partially risk rated and are often bundled with employer-sponsored health insurance. Moreover, on the margin, group prescription drug coverage is low cost due to the tax exclusion and the employer contribution to premiums. These factors strengthen the incentives for commercial employer-sponsored insurance take-up above and beyond the ''unsubsidized'' willingness to pay.
V. Identifying the Effects of Part D on Drug Expenditures
We estimate the effect of enrollment on negotiated prices paid by insurers. We then use these elasticity estimates to identify aggregate expenditure effects of Part D and decompose them into effects on consumers inside and outside the program.
A. Enrollment Effects and Retail Prices
While the marginal enrollment effects on unit profit levels are the most theoretically relevant, the effect of insurer size on prices drives changes in retail expenditures, which are of independent interest to policymakers. Given the available data on prices, an analysis of retail prices permits us to estimate enrollment effects as either elasticities or predicted changes in expenditures as a percent of baseline given the observed increases in insurer enrollment. Table 6 reports results from estimating equation (3), the log price equation. Column 1 reports results specifications that include all drugs. When there are 100,000 additional Part D enrollees, prices per pill in the commercial market are lower by 2%. For the mean prescription, given the actual distribution of insurer enrollment increases, Part D is predicted to have lowered overall prices by 7 percentage. The median effect is 8.5 percentage.
Consistent with the profit analysis, the enrollment effect on prices is concentrated in the price negotiations for generic drugs. The enrollment elasticity of 2 percentage decomposes into a 4.6 percentage decline in generic prices (column 3) but only a 0.2 percentage decline in branded prices (column 2). On average, given the distribution of observed enrollment increases, Part D lowered retail prices by 15 percentage for generic drugs and by less than 1.0 percentage for branded drugs.
Appendix table 3 reports specifications that define alternative comparison periods. As in the profit analysis, the fal- 21 Technically, the theory provides one other alternative explanation for this result, although it is much less direct and requires a number of conditions to hold. The first condition is that insurers with larger Part D enrollment increases also experience larger changes in generic quantity than in branded quantity. The second is that the pharmacy's surplus function is convex. In this case, pharmacy profits will rise by more for generic drugs than for branded drugs. We know of no evidence suggesting that bigger enrollment increases were (or should be) associated with bigger increases in the share of generic drugs purchased by an insurer, but there is no direct evidence to rule this explanation out either. 22 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this alternative explanation for the buyer size effects. 23 Detailed results and additional specifications are available on request.
sification test using price changes from 2004 to 2005 reveals no evidence of preexisting price trends that are correlated with eventual enrollment increases. The table also reports tests of whether the initial enrollment effects on prices are sustained into later periods. The effects appear to persist through April 2007, the latest month for which data are available. Consistent with the theory and previous empirical estimates, the buyer size effects are almost exclusively contained within the market for generic drugs. The effect of additional enrollment on prices for generics is stable and even increases slightly over time.
B. Quantifying the Internal and External Effects of Part D
The first-order effect of Part D implementation on welfare is equal to the change in expenditures, holding quantity fixed. We can decompose this expenditure change into components for enrollees inside and outside the Part D program, as shown in the following equation:
The first-order change in expenditures equals the change for Part D seniors who were cash paying at baseline, plus the change for individuals aged 60 and older who were commercially enrolled at baseline (on whom the analysis in section IV is based) and the change for commercially enrolled people under age 60. The first component is the direct, or internal, effect of Part D on the prices paid by Part D enrollees; the last two capture the first-order external spillover effects on the commercial market. In equation (12) 24 Our estimate of DExpend therefore reflects changes in prices, holding quantity consumed at pre-Part D levels, for each group j.
To estimate c 1 , we use our claims data to calculate that on average, uninsured cash-paying seniors who enroll in Part D experience an expenditure-weighted 30% reduction in annual drug prices between 2005 and 2006. This number must be scaled down to account for the fact that not every previously uninsured senior enrolled in Part D. According to the MEPS, uninsured seniors who chose to enroll in Part D accounted for 94 percentage of expenditures. 25 We thus Reports instrumental variables estimates of the effect of insurers' Part D enrollment on their unit profits earned in the commercial non-Part D market, by age group. Price changes are measured as the difference in the log retail price per pill, averaged at the insurer-NDC drug level, between the second half of 2005 and the comparison period noted in column headings. The key regressor is the change in the insurer's Part D enrollment between 2005 and 2006. Covariates include changes in the average number of pills per prescription, changes in the average per pill wholesale drug price, and changes in each insurer's exposure to the pharmacy (the state-level market share of the pharmacy, weighted by the fraction of the insurer's total retail expenditures in each state). The sample of drugs comprises the top 1,000 drugs ranked by expenditures observed in the claims. The instrument for Part D enrollment is potential Part D enrollment. Changes in log prices predicted by the model are reported for the insurer at the 50th percentile of enrollment increases and for the market average, given the distribution of observed enrollment increases. In all specifications, insurer-NDC-level observations are weighted by the number of claims for the NDC observed for that insurer. Parentheses report standard errors clustered at the insurer level. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. (Levy, 1999) . We assume that the two-thirds of individuals who enrolled in Part D have the highest expenditures among the baseline uninsured group. This generates an upper-bound estimate for the internal effect of Part D on previously uninsured seniors, resulting in a lowerbound estimate of the relative size of the external effect. Humana's contribution to external cost savings is based on estimates reported in appendix table 6, column 1. These estimates imply an annual external cost savings of $2.63 billion. This is equivalent to a 5.7 percentage decline in drug costs for enrollees Part D participating insurers.
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It is not clear how much of this expenditure reduction is retained by insurers and how much flows to the commercially insured. At a minimum, there is evidence of noncompetitive behavior in the group insurance market (Dafny, 2010) . Regardless of where the rents end up, they are likely to have significant effects on the distribution of welfare in the market.
On the one hand, if they are passed through to commercial enrollees, the total savings of $1.45 billion to $2.63 billion would imply that commercial enrollees of insurers that participate in Part D accrued total savings nearly equal to the savings experienced by the newly insured Part D beneficiaries. If retained entirely by insurers, the savings would imply that prescription drug costs for Part D insurers would have fallen by 3.7 to 5.7 percent and that the average profitability of their commercial prescription drug insurance operations would have risen by more than 5 percentage.
We arrive at this back-of-the-envelope calculation using loading factors in the individual health insurance market, estimated to range between 25 percentage and 40 percentage (Newhouse, 2002) . 31 We assume that average loads for stand-alone prescription drug insurance lie in this (wide) range. If so, we can calculate the minimum impact on profitability by taking 40 percentage as the loading factor and assuming that the entire load goes to profits. Under these conservative assumptions, a 3.7 percentage reduction in prescription drug costs translates into a 9.25 percentage boost to the average profitability of prescription drug insur-26 This figure includes spending by Humana that is internal to Medicare Part D. We compare this to external cost savings associated with Part Drelated insurer-size increases. Preferred estimates for the external cost savings do not include the savongs contributions from Humana, resulting in a lower-bound estimate of the relative size of the external effect.
27 Note that we make two assumptions when calculating the aggregate cost savings among the commercially insured: (a) that the fraction of claims covered by a Part D participating insurer observed in our data is representative of the national retail market, and (b) that the estimated enrollment elasticity and aggregate price reductions are representative of all commercial retail claims. 28 From the 2005 MEPS, we calculate that the Medicare share of drugs consumed by commercial insureds ages 60 and over is 0.467. For all commercially insureds aged 60 to 64, this figure is 0.319-30 percent smaller. Linearity implies that the enrollment elasticity on prices for the commercial population aged 60 to 64 will be 30 percent smaller than for the 60-and-over commercial insureds. This prediction lines up with table 6, where columns 4 to 6 are restricted to ages 60 to 64. Both the enrollment elasticity of prices and implied decreases in overall drug prices are 30 percent lower than corresponding price effects reported in columns 1 to 3. Linearity is also supported by aggregate data showing that the introduction of Part D was associated with declines in manufacturer revenues as a linear function of each drug's Medicare share (Duggan & Scott-Morton, 2010) . 29 The 5.3 percentage cost reduction is an expenditure-weighted average cost reductions estimated for 60-and-over and under-60 commercially enrolled populations of Part D participating insurers. 30 We estimate c 2 ¼ 40% À0:083 ð Þ¼À 3:32%. This is applied to the quantity Expend ¼ 63:7 billion. Combining these parameter estimates according to our decomposition formula, we find a first-order annual reduction in drug expenditures of $6.18 billion, of which we can attribute $2.63 billion (43 percentage) to the annual external cost savings to the market. 31 Loading factors in the large group market are estimated to range between 6 percentage and 10 percentage (Newhouse, 2002) ; using these numbers would yield much larger calculated effects on profitability.
ance provided by Part D-participating insurers. 32 If, instead, profits were equal to 25 percentage of premium revenue, a 3.7 percentage reduction in drug costs would translate into a 14.8 percentage increase in drug insurance profitability for Part D-participating insurers.
VI. Conclusion
We present a simple and stylized theoretical model that demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between buyer size and prices, with an application to the pharmaceutical industry. Even a simple model generates an ambiguous relationship between buyer size and prices. However, it does demonstrate that greater bargaining power by upstream manufacturers will mute whatever relationship exists. These simple results are meant to build on prior literature exploring the link between buyer size and pricing. While a number of different mechanisms may be operating to produce this relationship, all have similar and policyrelevant implications for the effects of public health insurance subsidy schemes, which are growing in importance.
In the case of Medicare Part D, publicly subsidized health insurance enrollment tilted bargaining power in favor of participating health insurers. Gains in their negotiating leverage came at the expense of pharmacies and generic drug manufacturers, both of which saw their profits erode. Branded drug manufacturers with more ex ante bargaining power seem to have escaped this erosion. The total size of the price reduction in the commercially enrolled marketplace was quite significant in relation to health insurer profitability and in terms of its aggregate value to the commercially enrolled population. Therefore, Part D may have transferred resources from competitive firms to firms with existing bargaining power. It also created substantial spillover effects onto the non-Part D marketplace. It is significant to note that these external effects are present in spite of the theoretical separation between commercial price negotiations and Part D price negotiations: These effects can exist only when Part D is administered through the private insurers with a large commercial enrollment external to Medicare.
Our results illustrate the interaction between insurer bargaining power and the competitive pressure faced by manufacturers. For molecules with less competition, insurer enrollment growth is unlikely to make significant price inroads, as manufacturers appear much more of the bargaining power. However, for drugs that have identical molecular equivalents, price negotiation by insurers can have significant benefits for consumers. The optimal degree of competitiveness that manufacturers face depends on both efficient drug pricing and the provision of sufficient incentives to innovate. Therefore, it is not clear whether policies to reduce manufacturer revenues would harm future welfare by more than they contribute to current welfare.
More generally, our findings suggest an important external effect of public subsidies for private health insurance. Direct and indirect subsidies are becoming more prevalent in the U.S. health care system, whether in the form of tax exemption for employer-based health insurance premiums or direct subsidies for insuring the poor. The welfare analysis of such policies must consider the spillover effects created by providing insurers with bargaining power. In our context, those external effects were quite significant relative to the internal price effects of the program. Of note, the landmark Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act extends private health insurance premium subsidies to millions of uninsured. As with Part D, it may represent another context in which spillover effects of public financing of private insurance on provider prices are important.
